Afghanistan - a Growing Insurgency

A formula for victory in Afghanistan appeared in this morning's Globe. Former government foreign policy advisor and now a professor of internationl affairs at Ottawa U., Roland Paris outlined five pre-conditions to winning in Afghanistan:

1. Stop destroying the poppy fields. Try regulating the stuff instead. Buy opium to reduce the global shortage of opium-based pain killers.

2. Clean up the corrupt police service.

3. Clean up government corruption.

4. Build a legitimate Afghan army that can defend its country.

5. Arrest the flow of Taliban fighters from their bases in Pakistan.

Professor Paris is a realist. He knows that these objectives won't be met without a wholesale increase in NATO support. He describes "the mission" as, "the most under-resourced international stabilization operation since the Second World War," pointing out we have one soldier per 1,000 Afghans whereas we had ratios of 3.5 in Haiti, 19 in Bosnia and 20.5 in Kosovo.

Paris argues that, unless NATO countries are willing to greatly increase their forces, NATO "should not wait around for conditions to worsen. It should withdraw, because the current course is a recipe for creeping defeat - and that would do untold damage to the alliance."

The Taliban are waging their war, the political war, while NATO continues to fight a mainly military war. The once mysterious Taliban are now becoming open to western journalists, undoubtedly with a view to waging their political war with the citizens of NATO states. To do this they've been giving western reporters a first-hand look at their operations.

The New York Times' Elizabeth Rubin spent time with the Taliban last summer. Some of her views:

"It is not at all clear that Afghans want the return of a Taliban government. But even sophisticated Kabulis told me that they are fed up with the corruption. And in the Pashtun regions, which make up about half the country, Afghans are fed up with five years of having their homes searched and the young men of their villages rounded up in the name of counterinsurgency.

"Earlier this month in Kabul, Gen. David Richards, the British commander of NATO’s Afghanistan force, imagined what Afghans are thinking: “They will say, ‘We do not want the Taliban, but then we would rather have that austere and unpleasant life that that might involve than another five years of fighting.”’ He estimated that if NATO didn’t succeed in bringing substantial economic development to Afghanistan soon, some 70 percent of Afghans would shift their loyalty to the Taliban."

The British newspaper, The Independent, had its David Loyn inspect the Taliban operation in Afghanistan:

"Racing across the desert in the north of Helmand province, our convoy was kicking up a dust-storm that could be seen from space. The Taliban were demonstrating their control over a wide region. These are the same Taliban that Brigadier Ed Butler, the commander of British forces in the region, said were "practically defeated" in Helmand.

"Instead, they are confident and well-armed, all with AK-47s, and many of them carry rocket-propelled grenadelaunchers.

"We passed the burnt-out remains of a Spartan armoured personnel carrier, destroyed on 1 August with the loss of three British lives. Last week the British were forced to abandon their "platoon house" at Musa Qala, and were only able to get their vehicles after a deal brokered by local tribal elders. The plan to spread goodwill from these "inkspots", and provide an environment to deliver aid, has had to be radically reviewed in the face of heavy Taliban attacks.

"Their communications equipment and vehicles are new and they have a constant supply of fresh men from the madrassas, the religious schools in Pakistan. Recently, the "Waziristan accord", which has seen Pakistani forces withdraw from parts of the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan, has made it even easier for the Taliban to manoeuvre."

"Meanwhile, the scale of institutionalised corruption practised by the Afghan National Army is shocking. They demand money at gunpoint from every driver on the main roads in the south. It was to stop just this kind of casual theft that the Taliban was formed in the first place in 1994. For the first time since then, the Taliban are now being paid again to sort out the problem."

Afghanistan is rivalling Iraq as a destination for foreign, Arab jihadists. According to the L.A. Times:

"Foreign fighters are predominantly Sunni. They increasingly prefer fighting alongside the Taliban to getting embroiled in the Sunni-versus-Shiite bloodshed in Iraq, said Caprioli, who works closely with the intelligence community at the Paris-based GEOS security firm.

"There are a certain number of foreign jihadis who aren't interested in massacring Shiites," Caprioli said. "In Afghanistan, you have NATO troops to fight as well as Americans, all the 'crusaders.' "

"In addition, veterans of combat in Iraq have made their way to Afghanistan, officials said.

"There's a definite increase in foreign fighters going to Afghanistan from all over," said a U.S. anti-terrorism official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. "They go through Pakistan. Or they train in Iraq and then keep going to Afghanistan."

Clearly the Taliban and their jihadist Arab allies are upping the ante in Afghanistan. Our politicians and generals continue to paint a rosey picture of the country as a battle that can and will be won. If that's going to happen, they'll need to substantially bolster NATO's efforts before the political war is lost.