Have We Failed Afghanistan Once Too Often?

Our news about the Afghanistan war usually arrives with a good helping of cheerleading. Our reporters write about how Canada's soldiers are making a difference and I'm sure, in our own very small way, we are. But the key words are "very small" because that's what we are. We have a force of barely 2,500 soldiers, 60% of whom are support personnel hunkered down in garrison, to control a province more than 55,000 sq. km. in area. That's very small indeed.

So gazing too intently at our very small experience doesn't help to gauge the overall situation in that country and, no matter how good we are, we're still just a relatively limited part of that overall situation.

So, six years after the Taliban were run out of Kabul, how is "the mission" really going? According to a review in today's Asia Times, we're not doing all that well:

"The US and allies arrived in Afghanistan in 2001 with burning ambitions and high ideals to turn Afghanistan into a model for development in an underdeveloped part of the world. Many Afghans placed their faith in Western promises that have gone largely unfulfilled.

"Many - if not most - Western development workers in Afghanistan now believe that the US and its allies have overreached and need to retrench with a new and accountable pragmatism.

"With a vast agenda of 'gender equality, civil society, open media, democratic transformation, capacity-building, counter-narcotics and religious tolerance', Western do-gooders have bitten off more than they can chew, they say. 'The more of these agendas we take on the more we doom ourselves to failure,' says one Western aid worker.

"'People's expectations were so high and they were raised more by the international community than anyone else, particularly when they heard about the billions of American dollars committed to Afghanistan,' says Saad Mohseni, the Afghan-Australian director of a large media conglomerate in Kabul. 'Afghans are asking what has happened to this money.'

"Beyond a sputtering economy, however, increasing numbers of Afghans wonder how with nearly 50,000 foreign troops in their country security could have diminished in the past two years. 'When I arrived here in 2002, it was just a fear of these international forces in the country that enabled Afghan society to function,' even without a police force, says Mohseni. 'Today, the new Afghan police force is something that people fear. It has become synonymous with crime in the minds of the public.'

"Afghan citizens also appear befuddled at the prospect of endless fighting in the hinterlands, particularly in the south of the country. NATO's consistent failure to capture Osama bin Laden and his chief lieutenant Ayman al-Zawahiri in nearby Pakistan confuses many Afghans, but many consider it the least of their problems.

"'For Afghans, the 'global war on terror' was something for the rest of the world,' says Sanjar Qiam, the general manager of a leading national radio station. 'For Afghans it was about getting rid of the Taliban and getting rid of the Northern Alliance, but we still have both of them, and they seem to be getting stronger by the day.'"

From this account and so many others like it we should realize that we need to take a hard look at "the mission" in Afghanistan and see whether we've really made any progress at all. Sure we ran out the ruling gang of thugs, the Taliban, but we then handed the reins of power to the other gang of thugs, our allies, the Northern Alliance. We started this thing on the wrong foot and we haven't moved off that foot for six years.

Washington has no answers and neither do Harpo and Hillier. That doesn't mean we shouldn't be putting the hard questions to them.