We're Failing in Afghanistan

Brian Stewart had an excellent analysis piece on Afghanistan on CBC last night. It examined "the mission" and why the NATO-led ISAF has failed and will continue to fail.

In a nutshell, not enough troops, not even half as many required for the job. And, of the force that is deployed, so many contingents are subject to special conditions imposed by their home countries as to make them of little, if any, value. That means NATO is fielding just a small fraction of the force needed to secure Afghanistan, the sine qua non of counter-insurgency warfare.

Why are we stuck with an irresponsibly small NATO force? Because the NATO brass, like our own Hillier, didn't do their homework before devising "the mission." They thought the Taliban was done, reduced to shattered remnants hanging around to be mopped up. That's why Hillier spoke of marching to Kandahar to kill a "few dozen ..scumbags." He believed 2,500 soldiers would be enough to do the job that he had in his mind and, had the situation been as he understood it, Hillier would be a great hero today. The problem was - and is - that it wasn't and isn't. The few dozen have turned into several hundred, possibly thousands and while the bad guys have grown substantially, we're still sitting there with 2,500 soldiers, 1,000 of which are combat troops.

Stewart interviewed a couple of military experts - not retired hacks but the real deal - who, in terms of progress, said we've regressed to the state of affairs around 2003. One pointed out the sole, key strategic objective of the entire country - the ring road that goes around Afghanistan's massive, central highlands (sorry for the Vietnam reference) to link every region and major city in the country.

The ring road, in case you haven't guessed, is under Taliban control. That means they can control pretty much anything that moves from one part of the country to any other part. Why do they control this strategic key? Because our side doesn't have enough soldiers to hold this road even if we did manage to wrest control of it away from the Taliban.

Now the Taliban is outnumbered although the estimate Stewart gave of their numbers now within Afghanistan was that the insurgency has grown to between 15,000 and 20,000 fighters. That's 15,000 to 20,000 effectives, properly led, none of them subject to host nation "caveats" and with plenty more on the other side of the border with Pakistan. The problem is that we don't have adequate forces to limit their mobility whereas our side has to allocate a good deal of its strength to base security and patrolling at least a few parts of the countryside. The Taliban therefore have the initiative. They come and go pretty much as they please, attacking and withdrawing when and where and how and for so long as they choose.

Have you noticed how, when we kick the hell out of the insurgents with our firepower and our armour and air support, they always somehow manage to "retreat"? Ever wonder why we're not all over them, rounding up the defeated survivors by the hundreds and thousands? There is a reason for that but it's not a good reason if you're looking to win in guerrilla warfare.

One of the guests on Stewart's piece noted how NATO measures success in schools built and wells dug. He claimed NATO always uses those references so it can avoid discussing its Achilles' Heel, the ring road.

Whether it comes from de Hoop Scheffer in Brussels, or Rick Hillier at NDHQ or our clown prince on Parliament Hill, there's one thing that's in critically short supply and that's honesty. We're not getting an honest and candid assessment of the mission in Afghanistan. That is nothing short of a betrayal of our soldiers by those who most loudly claim to support them. We won't have to wait very long to learn whether John Manley will be joining their ranks. My guess is that he will but I sure hope I'm wrong.