Why We Can't Win in Afghanistan

The preceding item deals with NATO's conundrum on how to stop killing so many Afghan civilians in the war with the Taliban. However we also need to accept that we're not going to defeat the Taliban militarily and that this war will drag on, if the Karzai government can survive, until there are some fundamental changes involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Malcolm Rifkind, former British foreign secretary and secretary of state for defence, laid it all out recently in The Independent:

"...when under pressure the Taliban, and their al-Qa'ida colleagues, retreat to the wild frontier area on the borders between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In these regions, nominally part of Pakistan, the writ of Islamabad does not run, and the rebels can find respite, reorganise, train and recruit.

"... it is widely known that elements within Pakistan, particularly in the army and the intelligence service, are either helping the Taliban or, at least, are turning a blind eye to them.

"...the United States and Britain are at fault for not fully understanding why the Pakistanis are reluctant to dismantle the Taliban. It is not because of any sympathy for terrorism or admiration of al-Qa'ida, a distinct organisation from the Taliban. It is because of longstanding Pakistani national interests that have been largely ignored by the West.

"The first point to realise is that the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan has never been recognised by successive Afghan governments, and remains a bone of contention. Given that the Pashtun and Baluchi people straddle the border, this has alarming implications for Islamabad.

"The Pashtuns are the leading tribal grouping in Afghanistan and there have been several insurgencies by the Baluchis in Pakistan's southernmost province. The issue is, however, even more complicated, linked as it is to the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir, and to wider India-Pakistan relations.

"During the Cold War, the Afghan monarchy allied itself with the Soviet Union and India in an attempt to obtain weapons to use against the Pakistanis, who were, in turn, supplied by the United States. The Indians, for their part, were happy to see a Pakistan weakened and distracted by frontier problems on their western border.

"Against this background, the Pakistanis, who have always been sensitive about the integrity of their state, welcomed the Taliban as they were religious fundamentalists, not Pashtun nationalists, and therefore had no claim on Pakistani territory.

"The five years of Taliban rule in Kabul were the only exception to 60 years of poor Afghan-Pakistani relations since 1948. Barnett Rubin, a regional analyst, has remarked that from a Pakistani perspective Taliban rule is very acceptable: 'An unstable Afghanistan is the second-best option to a stable one ruled by your friends.'

"If the United States and Britain want more wholehearted co-operation from Pakistan they need to work with the grain of Pakistani self-interest. This could be achieved in three ways. First, Mr Karzai and his government must be pressed to recognise the current frontier with Pakistan, known as the Durand Line. Second, India should be encouraged to reduce its presence in Afghanistan. It has opened two consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad. The Pakistanis fear that these are being used as bases from which to foment mischief. Third, Musharraf must be encouraged to introduce more normal politics into Waziristan and the frontier areas. At present, political parties are banned, giving Islamic jihadists and their allies a free run at winning local hearts and minds.

"Winning in Afghanistan means defeating the Taliban and al-Qa'ida in Helmand. It means winning the support of the Afghan people through social reform and economic growth. But all that effort may be wasted if the frontier region of Pakistan remains a safe haven."

If you've read this far you may have the sinking feeling that we've misplayed our hand in Afghanistan for the last six years. That leaves us having to decide whether we just write that off and start again or accept our defeat and try to work out some deal between Kabul and the Taliban - just like the Kabul government wants.