In today's New York Times, Nobel economist and Princeton professor Paul Krugman succinctly sums up the economic nightmare hitting Greece and how it ripples through the Euro:
...During the years of easy money, wages and prices in the crisis countries rose much faster than in the rest of Europe. Now that the money is no longer rolling in, those countries need to get costs back in line.
But that’s a much harder thing to do now than it was when each European nation had its own currency. Back then, costs could be brought in line by adjusting exchange rates — e.g., Greece could cut its wages relative to German wages simply by reducing the value of the drachma in terms of Deutsche marks. Now that Greece and Germany share the same currency, however, the only way to reduce Greek relative costs is through some combination of German inflation and Greek deflation. And since Germany won’t accept inflation, deflation it is.
The problem is that deflation — falling wages and prices — is always and everywhere a deeply painful process. It invariably involves a prolonged slump with high unemployment. And it also aggravates debt problems, both public and private, because incomes fall while the debt burden doesn’t.
Hence the crisis. Greece’s fiscal woes would be serious but probably manageable if the Greek economy’s prospects for the next few years looked even moderately favorable. But they don’t. Earlier this week, when it downgraded Greek debt, Standard & Poor’s suggested that the euro value of Greek G.D.P. may not return to its 2008 level until 2017, meaning that Greece has no hope of growing out of its troubles.
All this is exactly what the euro-skeptics feared. Giving up the ability to adjust exchange rates, they warned, would invite future crises. And it has.
...what are the lessons for the rest of us?
The deficit hawks are already trying to appropriate the European crisis, presenting it as an object lesson in the evils of government red ink. What the crisis really demonstrates, however, is the dangers of putting yourself in a policy straitjacket. When they joined the euro, the governments of Greece, Portugal and Spain denied themselves the ability to do some bad things, like printing too much money; but they also denied themselves the ability to respond flexibly to events.
And when crisis strikes, governments need to be able to act. That’s what the architects of the euro forgot — and the rest of us need to remember.
Let this be a lesson to those who advocate monetary union between Canada and the United States. To adopt a common currency, that is to say the greenback, would be an enormous policy straightjacket for Canada. Enough. No way.
A fellow from Halifax, Charles W. Moore, suggested exactly that in an op-ed. He suggested that common currency with US would be a boom for Canadian economy. A boom followed by a big bust I think.
Moore is out of his mind although I suspect his enthusiasm for a common currency may have faded since America's fiscal meltdown. When you're the junior partner, a common currency usually means a loss of independence in monetary policy. When your senior partner is up to its alligators in debt that's more than just a little dangerous.
Actually it was a recent op-ed. His main argument was that now the Canadian dollar is at par with US it is good time to go for a common currency. I goodled and found this link to his op-ed.
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