Three posts on Afghanistan today. Sorry about that but I thought this item in today's Asia Times Online deserved mention. It's an opinion piece written by M K Bhadrakumar, a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service for over 29 years. He discusses what the turmoil in Pakistan sparked by the Bhutto assassination may mean for NATO forces in neighbouring Afghanistan.
The German weekly Der Spiegel reported in mid-December that at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and at NATO military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, top-secret strategy games have been held about worst-case scenarios in Afghanistan. That may turn out to be smart forward thinking. The computer simulations assumed that if the situation in Pakistan were to spin out of control, the Taliban would get a free run on the border regions with Afghanistan, and NATO's supply lines through Pakistan might be jeopardized.
...three-quarters of the supplies for the 26,000-strong US military deployment in Afghanistan flowed via Pakistan by land and air. "Clearly, we do not like the situation we find ourselves in right now," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell commented.
In many ways, it is a classic boomerang. With Bhutto's assassination, Pakistan, which became seriously destabilized by America's "war on terror", may be about to turn the heat on US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. According to Der Spiegel, senior NATO leaders fear that "Pakistan could very well descend into total chaos after the elections scheduled for January". (These have now been postponed until February.) NATO leaders assess that everything depends critically on President Pervez Musharraf "managing to retain his hold on power". If he doesn't, "the already half-heartened efforts by the Pakistani military leadership, permeated with Islamists, to stem Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in the Pashtun tribal regions could fail completely".
But Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institute, who is an authority on the Pakistani military, doubts whether the Pakistani generals any longer have the will to push back the Islamists. He adds, "What we do know is that there is a large 'alumni' association of former intelligence operatives, tolerated by the army and the intelligence services - or perhaps simply beyond their reach."
Washington's frustration is two-fold. On the one hand, it has limitations in augmenting troop strength in Afghanistan. At the same venue where Gates spoke, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, frankly admitted that the US military has limitations in what it can do in Afghanistan due to overstretch in Iraq. He said, "In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must. The war in Afghanistan is, by design and necessity, an economy-of-force operation. There's no getting around that ... Our main focus, militarily in the region and in the world right now, is rightly and firmly in Iraq."
On the other hand, NATO allies stubbornly refuse to pay heed to Washington's calls for increased troop contributions. European opinion is steadily turning against the war in Afghanistan. In Germany, the latest opinion polls, in December, indicated that half the population favored withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. The same is the case in Canada. In the event of an opposition victory in this year's parliamentary election, a withdrawal of Canadian troops will be likely. The Dutch have already decided to pull out. It may trigger a domino effect. The Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway are already in the process of withdrawing their troops from northern Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the Taliban have begun moving toward the Amu Darya region in northern Afghanistan. They seem to be virtually repeating their strategy in the 1996-98 period, making their northern advance in a pincer movement. One arm of the Taliban is moving toward Kabul from strongholds in Helmand and the southeastern provinces, while other groups are moving up from Kandahar along the Iranian border regions and the western provinces of Herat, Badghis and Faryab. (Faryab has old Pashtun settlements.)
In October, the Taliban tested the waters by overrunning several districts in the Faryab and Badghis region. The Bala Murghab, Ghormach and Qades districts of Badghis are virtually under Taliban control. They are recruiting people in the countryside. They have established intelligence and operational networks in most district centers in the northwestern provinces. In 1997, the Taliban used Badghis as the base for their operations in the provinces to the east, such as Jowzjan and Balkh.
They have also begun harassing the 400-strong German contingent in the northern province of Kunduz with sporadic firing, booby traps and mines and firing rockets and rocket-propelled grenades into German camps. A concerted Taliban attempt to capture Kunduz, a highly strategic area in the north, seems a possibility. The fall of Kunduz in 1997 to the Taliban was a turning point in their capture of the Amu Darya region, including the remote Takhar and Badakhshan regions in the east.
All signs are that the war effort is deteriorating. What is taking place is the syndrome in which the Soviet occupying troops in the 1980s found themselves trapped - tactical achievements but a potential strategic failure.
NATO forces control major cities but the countryside where three quarters of Afghan people live is beyond their control. The London Sunday Times featured a devastating article in November lampooning the German troops in the relatively tranquil northern Afghanistan who refuse to venture out of their camps after dark. The report, titled "For us ze war is over by tea time, ja", cited that in one case, German troops engaged in an operation near Kunduz left the battlefield by afternoon so they could return to the safety of their camp by sundown, and that German troops "spend much of their time in an enormous base, complete with beer halls and nightclubs".
Contrary to NATO propaganda, the Taliban seem to face no difficulty in recruiting new volunteers from a vast pool of disaffected Afghans. This is quite understandable, since, as an Asia Foundation survey in December assessed, some 80% of Afghans are disillusioned with the Kabul government.
The German weekly Der Spiegel reported in mid-December that at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Allied Joint Force Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands, and at NATO military headquarters in Mons, Belgium, top-secret strategy games have been held about worst-case scenarios in Afghanistan. That may turn out to be smart forward thinking. The computer simulations assumed that if the situation in Pakistan were to spin out of control, the Taliban would get a free run on the border regions with Afghanistan, and NATO's supply lines through Pakistan might be jeopardized.
...three-quarters of the supplies for the 26,000-strong US military deployment in Afghanistan flowed via Pakistan by land and air. "Clearly, we do not like the situation we find ourselves in right now," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell commented.
In many ways, it is a classic boomerang. With Bhutto's assassination, Pakistan, which became seriously destabilized by America's "war on terror", may be about to turn the heat on US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. According to Der Spiegel, senior NATO leaders fear that "Pakistan could very well descend into total chaos after the elections scheduled for January". (These have now been postponed until February.) NATO leaders assess that everything depends critically on President Pervez Musharraf "managing to retain his hold on power". If he doesn't, "the already half-heartened efforts by the Pakistani military leadership, permeated with Islamists, to stem Taliban and al-Qaeda activities in the Pashtun tribal regions could fail completely".
But Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institute, who is an authority on the Pakistani military, doubts whether the Pakistani generals any longer have the will to push back the Islamists. He adds, "What we do know is that there is a large 'alumni' association of former intelligence operatives, tolerated by the army and the intelligence services - or perhaps simply beyond their reach."
Washington's frustration is two-fold. On the one hand, it has limitations in augmenting troop strength in Afghanistan. At the same venue where Gates spoke, Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, frankly admitted that the US military has limitations in what it can do in Afghanistan due to overstretch in Iraq. He said, "In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must. The war in Afghanistan is, by design and necessity, an economy-of-force operation. There's no getting around that ... Our main focus, militarily in the region and in the world right now, is rightly and firmly in Iraq."
On the other hand, NATO allies stubbornly refuse to pay heed to Washington's calls for increased troop contributions. European opinion is steadily turning against the war in Afghanistan. In Germany, the latest opinion polls, in December, indicated that half the population favored withdrawing troops from Afghanistan. The same is the case in Canada. In the event of an opposition victory in this year's parliamentary election, a withdrawal of Canadian troops will be likely. The Dutch have already decided to pull out. It may trigger a domino effect. The Czech Republic, Denmark and Norway are already in the process of withdrawing their troops from northern Afghanistan.
Meanwhile, the Taliban have begun moving toward the Amu Darya region in northern Afghanistan. They seem to be virtually repeating their strategy in the 1996-98 period, making their northern advance in a pincer movement. One arm of the Taliban is moving toward Kabul from strongholds in Helmand and the southeastern provinces, while other groups are moving up from Kandahar along the Iranian border regions and the western provinces of Herat, Badghis and Faryab. (Faryab has old Pashtun settlements.)
In October, the Taliban tested the waters by overrunning several districts in the Faryab and Badghis region. The Bala Murghab, Ghormach and Qades districts of Badghis are virtually under Taliban control. They are recruiting people in the countryside. They have established intelligence and operational networks in most district centers in the northwestern provinces. In 1997, the Taliban used Badghis as the base for their operations in the provinces to the east, such as Jowzjan and Balkh.
They have also begun harassing the 400-strong German contingent in the northern province of Kunduz with sporadic firing, booby traps and mines and firing rockets and rocket-propelled grenades into German camps. A concerted Taliban attempt to capture Kunduz, a highly strategic area in the north, seems a possibility. The fall of Kunduz in 1997 to the Taliban was a turning point in their capture of the Amu Darya region, including the remote Takhar and Badakhshan regions in the east.
All signs are that the war effort is deteriorating. What is taking place is the syndrome in which the Soviet occupying troops in the 1980s found themselves trapped - tactical achievements but a potential strategic failure.
NATO forces control major cities but the countryside where three quarters of Afghan people live is beyond their control. The London Sunday Times featured a devastating article in November lampooning the German troops in the relatively tranquil northern Afghanistan who refuse to venture out of their camps after dark. The report, titled "For us ze war is over by tea time, ja", cited that in one case, German troops engaged in an operation near Kunduz left the battlefield by afternoon so they could return to the safety of their camp by sundown, and that German troops "spend much of their time in an enormous base, complete with beer halls and nightclubs".
Contrary to NATO propaganda, the Taliban seem to face no difficulty in recruiting new volunteers from a vast pool of disaffected Afghans. This is quite understandable, since, as an Asia Foundation survey in December assessed, some 80% of Afghans are disillusioned with the Kabul government.
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