That was my initial reaction when I read Murray Brewster's piece on Afghanistan, "Taliban Jack" No Longer Alone.
After effusively praising Jack Layton for introducing the entire planet to the idea of negotiating with the Taliban even though both the Brits and Karzai were parlaying with the insurgency before Jack ever breathed a word of it, Brewster went on to make some remarkable claims about the mission.
He talked about a "battlefield strategy" that is "part of an evolving counter-insurgency doctrine" by Western military leaders in Afghanistan. Strategy? That's rich. And it's heartwarming to realize that we actually have a "counter-insurgency doctrine" where none has been evident before. Is everyone rushing off for talks with the Taliban a counter-insurgency doctrine? Well, there's nothing else so I guess, to Mr. Brewster, that must be it.
The scary thing is what if Brewster's right? What if this is our battlefield strategy, our counter-insurgency doctrine? Oh dear.