Saturday, December 09, 2006

Another Warning on Afghanistan - Is Anyone in Ottawa Listening?


For months, South Asian newspapers have reported a gradual tide change occurring among the people of southern Afghanistan and the insurgency. These accounts have told of a renewed insurgency and a steadily disaffected populace, especially in the countryside.

There have been a couple of instances where warnings came from British generals. Some have bluntly said that NATO has six months to win over the locals or the game is lost, we have to make real breakthroughs in reconstruction over the winter months, and so on. While all this has been going on, Ottawa has been mute. Maybe acknowledging the growing threat might cause people to ask inconvenient questions like why are we not reinforcing our contingent in Kandahar, the very soldiers who can be expected to have to take the brunt of the spring offensive?

Recently warning has come of a much changed insurgency that has grown to include not just the recharged Taliban but also the drug lords, mujahadeen and even disaffected youth fresh from the madrassas.

Why is Ottawa not bolstering our very vulnerable force? Is Harper treating the Afghan mission as a political issue instead of military problem? Is he unwilling to get into a situation that could well prove embarrassing for his counterpart in Washington?

The latest warning comes from the LA Times. The headline reads, "Afghanistan War Nears Tipping Point."

"I think we are approaching a tipping point, perhaps early in the new year," said a Western diplomat in the region, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to discuss the situation publicly.

"Popular support for the central government is faltering, and Western military allies are deeply divided over how best to combat the insurgency.

"On the other side of the fight, the Taliban has regained the strength to dominate large swathes of Afghanistan; government control is tenuous at best in at least 20% of the country, according to several Western diplomats and Afghan officials.

"Militants have built a network of bases in the tribal hinterlands that straddle the frontier with Pakistan. Over the last year, a growing number of mobile encampments on the Afghan side of the border have given the insurgents greater self-sufficiency, military officials say, although the guerrillas still draw heavily on logistical support and weaponry funneled from the Pakistani side.

"'They can come and go pretty much undetected,' acknowledged U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Michael T. Harrison Sr., who is overseeing the training and equipping of the struggling Afghan national army.

Within Afghanistan, civilians increasingly bear the brunt not only of insurgent attacks, but NATO's offensive against the militants. In October, a NATO airstrike in the south killed more than 30 civilians, most thought to be nomadic herders. Civilian deaths account for about one-quarter of the fatalities this year and heighten Afghans' resentment of the foreign military forces while feeding a gnawing sense of insecurity.
In terms of casualties, the conflict is a lopsided one. The number of insurgent fatalities over the last year could be as high as 7,000, according to some independent estimates. But the Taliban and its allies draw on what appears to be an almost inexhaustible supply of potential foot soldiers.
"Recruitment is not a problem for them - not a problem at all," said Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent security analyst in Pakistan.

"The allies are well aware that simply killing large numbers of insurgents will not constitute a victory. Western officials say they need to prevent the militants from seizing and holding more territory, establish reasonably secure conditions in the capital and the hinterlands, choke off infiltration across the porous Pakistani border and mend fences with restive tribal leaders.

"All those tasks are proving difficult.

"The insurgents include remnants of the Taliban, the austere Islamist movement that ruled Afghanistan for five years and gave shelter to Osama bin Laden and other members of his Al Qaeda terrorist network. The volatile brew also includes competing warlords, part-time fighters, recruits from the growing ranks of the poor and unemployed, and disaffected youth, often graduates of Talibaninspired religious seminaries.

"Viktor Korgun, an analyst with the Russian Academy of Sciences who has had long experience in Afghan affairs, describes the insurgents as 'a fresh new generation ... copying the skills and ways of the armed resistance groups in Iraq.'

"Their support network has improved, and in some areas they've been able to operate and control roads and villages and the like," said Seth Jones, a counterinsurgency expert at the Rand Corp. who was recently in Afghanistan for field research. "The Taliban have created a shadow government in a number of provinces - people going to Taliban governors rather than centrally appointed governors on rule- of-law issues."

"The Taliban holds sway in much of the border province of Zabol, several Afghan and Western officials say. And in other provinces, including Kandahar and Helmand, the insurgents operate freely outside major cities and towns.

"A number of interlocking factors have contributed to the insurgent comeback:

The U.S.-backed government of President Hamid Karzai has been slow in asserting itself throughout the country.

Afghanistan's drug trade has also revived at an explosive rate. Opium cultivation rose this year by nearly 60%, according to the United Nations drug agency and the World Bank, and officials say drug money has become a driving force behind the insurgency.

In much of the country, the lack of security has severely stunted development projects, which in turn has fostered widespread disillusionment. Particularly in dirt-poor rural areas, many Afghans believe their daily lot has improved little since Taliban times, and tend to cast the blame on the same Americans they once hailed as liberators.

"'People previously were repelled by the fanaticism of the Taliban, but anger at Americans is growing,' said Talat Masood, a retired Pakistani general who is now an independent analyst.

"'And ultimately, they would prefer that their lives be secure. It's a survival instinct.'"

In many ways the success or failure of Canada's mission in Kandahar will hinge on security, our ability to make and keep the countryside secure for the people, secure against the insurgency.

Security is a 24-hour a day issue. Securing territory for a few hours a day is meaningless, perhaps even worse. What fate befalls civilians who might be seen to assist or support the government or NATO forces when those protectors leave at the end of the day to return to their garrisons?

Security is extremely labour-intensive. It requires a sufficiently large force deployed throughout the operational area to be able to maintain dominance over the insurgents at all times. It's a turf war and you have to stand your ground to win and, more importantly, to win over the locals. Passing through a couple of times a day with an armoured patrol simply doesn't control territory or secure the area to protect the citizens from the insurgents.

If you can't keep the insurgents at bay, unable to intimidate even control the citizenry, you lose. They may not want to side with the bad guys but you've left them no other option.

We can field fewer than a thousand combat soldiers for the whole province of Kandahar. If you get them operational for 12-hours a day, that's 500-soldiers at any given time for the province. This force can't secure the territory now which allows the insurgents to win by default.

Our soldiers have repeatedly shown themselves to be wonderfully brave, and committed and capable but there is only so much they can be expected to accomplish with their limited numbers. It's time we started thinking about what we're doing for them.

The concensus is plain: there is to be a powerful spring offensive from a coalition insurgency that will seek to overwhelm the NATO forces to drive on Kabul. To meet this threat we need a larger force in Kandahar. If we're going to provide that reinforcement, we'll have to start the preparations for assembling, training, equipping and transporting those reinforcements well in advance.

But we're not going to reinforce our contingent unless our political leaders are willing to take their heads out of the sand, acknowledge this anticipated threat and discuss what needs to be done to meet it.

Stephen Harper knows that opposition is growing to this Afghan mission. He knows that questioning the whole business won't be received well in Brussels or Washington. He knows that openly acknowledging this problem may further undermine support at home. Stephen Harper is in a position where the has to choose between supporting our soldiers or defending his political position.

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